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Is the Taylor rule really different
from the McCallum rule?
Abstract
2
When base velocity is a stable function of the Federal funds rate
(FFR), the money base-nominal GDP targeting rule (McCallum rule)
can be re-parameterised and presented in terms of FFR as the policy
instrument.  Comparison of this McCallum modified policy rule with
the popular Taylor rule suggests that these two rules and the FFR are
actually cointegrated.  Model-based evaluations of the two rules’
stabilisation properties indicate that the modified McCallum rule is
similar to the Taylor rule.  The key to this result is the degree of
interest rate smoothing applied to the policy rules.
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1 Introduction
The Taylor rule (Taylor, 1993) has become very popular in recent
years. The rule represents an automatic response of the Federal funds
rate (FFR) to any deviation of the inflation rate from a desired target
value and to the output gap (deviation of real GDP from its
potential).  In essence, the rule involves changes of the ex-ante real
interest rate, relative to its equilibrium value.
The money base-nominal GDP targeting rule (McCallum, 1988) is
also an adaptive policy formula, but with a different policy
instrument and a different underlying theory of transmission
mechanism. The policy instrument is the money base instead of the
FFR.  With this rule, the money-base growth rate changes in
response to deviation of the nominal GDP growth rate (or the level)
from a desired target value that grows at a specified rate. The rule
also allows for gradual changes in base velocity. Nominal GDP
targeting and money base targeting are equivalent when changes in
base velocity are not large.
Meltzer (1987), Gordon (1985), Hall and Mankiw (1994) and
Feldstein and Stock (1994) recommended a nominal GDP targeting
rule for monetary policy.  However, many researchers suggest that
the McCallum money-base targeting rule has undesirable
stabilisation properties. Goodhart (1994) and Blinder (1994) provide
arguments against the money base rule.  Recently, Orphanides
(1999) and McCallum (2000) suggested a nominal GDP rule
(without money base) similar to the Taylor rule in that the policy
instrument is the FFR, but instead of the output gap it has nominal
GDP, inflation and an equilibrium real interest rate on the RHS.
Rudebusch (2001a) argues that the stabilisation property of this rule
is also poor.  However, the Federal Reserve Board own research
(Orphanides, Porter, Reifschneider, Tetlow and Finan, 2000)
demonstrates that this type of rules dominates the Taylor rule when
it is difficult to accurately assess the state of the economy in real
time.  By contrast, the Taylor rule appears to dominate if one
assumes artificially low degrees of uncertainty.  McCallum (2001)
studies the same problem and reaches the same conclusion.2
To test whether the Taylor rule is really different from the
McCallum rule, this paper modifies the McCallum rule.  I replace
the money base as the policy instrument with the FFR by appealing
to empirical evidence that base velocity is a stable function of the
FFR.  Then I compare this rule, which is no longer a money base
rule, to the Taylor rule using quarterly data for the United States.  I
find that the modified McCallum rule, the Taylor rule and the FFR
are cointegrated.  Then I test its model-based stabilisation properties
during the period 1980-2000 using the New Keynesian model in
Rudebusch (2001a) and Dennis (2001).
3
Provided that the two policy rules have similar degrees of
“sufficiently high” interest rate smoothing, I find that the modified
McCallum rule behaves just as well as the Taylor rule.  I test for the
equality of the unconditional variances of inflation, the output gap
and the change in the interest rate across three variants of the New
Keynesian model that differ in the degree of forwardness of
expectations.  Equality of unconditional variances cannot be
rejected.
In summary, this paper offers two propositions.  Let the Taylor rule
be given by  1 1 1 1 1 ) 1 ( ) , (     t t t i x f i    , where  t i is the interest
rate, ) , (  t x f  is the rule’s argument ( t x is a variable and is a
parameter), and  1 0 1    is a smoothing parameter.  And let another
rule (eg, the McCallum rule) be given by
1 2 2 2 2 ) 1 ( ) , (     t t t i y g i    , where  t i  is the interest rate, ) , (  t y g is
the rule’s argument ( t y is a variable and  is a parameter) and
1 0 2    is a smoothing parameter, then it is trivial to show that
that given ) , (  t x f  ) , (  t y g ,  t 1 i will be equal to  t i2 when
0 2 1    .  The second proposition is that if ) , (  t y g is more
variable than ) , x ( f t   then one can make  t 1 i   t 2 i if both  1   and
2  0  , and  1 2    , which means more interest rate smoothing.
The Taylor rule is briefly discussed in section 2.  In section 3, the
modified money-base rule is derived and the two rules are compared.
Model-based evaluations of the rules are found in section 4.
Conclusions are in section 5.
                                       
3 The data source in this paper is the Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis Website.
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2 Taylor rule
The Taylor rule is typically given by the following formula, though
it could be written, and its variables may be defined, in many
different ways.
) ~ ( ) ( ~
*
t y t P t t y P P P r i            (1)
The policy instrument in the Taylor rule is the FFR thus 
*
t i is the FFR
implied by the rule (in per cent).  The first variable on the RHS of
the Taylor rule is the average real interest rate or the equilibrium real
interest rater .  In annual terms, Taylor chooses 2 per cent.
4 The
second term in the Taylor rule, t P  , is either the contemporaneous
inflation rate defined as  400 * ) ln (ln 1   t t P P , where t Pis a measure of
the price level or its lagged value or the average inflation rate
a
t P  ,







i t P ). The third term
in brackets is the deviation of the inflation rate from a specified
target. The target value of the inflation rate P  is set to 2 per cent in
Taylor’s original paper. The last term in brackets is the output gap
defined as the deviation of real GDP from trend, which could be
obtained by the HP filter or any other measure.
5  Taylor also sets the
coefficients P   and y ~  equal to 0.5.
6
Figure 1 plots the Taylor rules and the actual FFR from 1960 to
2000.  To compute equation (1), I use average CPI inflation over
four quarters. The output gap is measured as the deviation of real
GDP from potential output, which is measured using the
                                       
4 The equilibrium real interest rate is unobservable. It is not clear whether, or not,
the equilibrium real interest rate should be constant over time.  Laubach and
Williams (2001) argue that it will.
5 It could be measured in many different ways and it is a proxy for excess demand
in the economy.
6 Many have estimated different values directly from the data.4
Congressional Budget Office estimate of potential output,
P
t y , and r
and  P   are set equal to 2.  Both  P    and  y ~   are set equal to 0.5.
The Taylor rule has the disadvantage that the real interest rate and
the output gap are both unobservable.  Orphanides (2000, 2001)
show that under-predicting and over-predicting the output gap can
lead to some serious policy errors.  The output gap is also subject to
data uncertainty, ie, whether it is measured using real time data or
data ex post.
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The Taylor rule can also be written in the following form:
) ( 1
*
    t t t i i i  (2)
Substituting for 
*
t i from (1) into (2) gives:




t t i y P P P r i  (3)
And in levels:




t t i y P P P r i     (4)
This kind of formulation implies that the Fed moves its instrument
(short-term interest rate) closer to the desired interest rate gradually.
Economists call this “interest rate smoothing” or “policy inertia.”
Rudebusch (2001b) provides a good discussion about these two
descriptions, which will become a key issue in this paper.
                                       
7 Real time data is beyond the scope of this paper.



















There are many estimates of   in the literature, but two of them are
well known.  Judd and Rudebusch (1998) estimated the smoothing
parameter  to be 0.27 using a single-equation estimation technique,
and Clarida et al. (2000) estimated it to be 0.21 using GMM. Both
studies use quarterly data for the sample that covers the Volcker-
Greenspan chairmanship periods.  The Taylor rule in equation (4)
can be computed using the average of those two estimates, 0.24.
Figure 2 plots equation (4).
Note that interest rate smoothing makes the interest rate path implied
by the rule much more similar to the actual FFR.  Compare figure 2
with figure 1.
3 Money base-nominal GDP targeting rule
Now consider the money base-nominal GDP targeting rule.
) ( t x
a
t t x x V x b            (5)
The policy instrument is the growth rate of the money base
400 * ) ln (ln 1   t t b b .  The first term on the RHS of equation (5),  x  ,
is the target value of the growth rate of nominal GDP – a constant,
which McCallum assumes to be 4.5 per cent.  The second term is
average base velocity (McCallum uses a four year period) where
base velocity is defined as the ratio of nominal GDP to the money
base.  The term  t x x     is the deviation of nominal GDP growth
rate from its (constant) targeted value.  McCallum assumes that  x  
is 0.5.


















A major advantage this rule has over the Taylor rule is that it does
not include unobservable variables such as the real interest rate and
the output gap.  It seems that the major disadvantage of this rule is
that the instrument is the money base and not the FFR.
8
It is hard to compare the two rules in equations (1) and (5) directly
because the monetary policy instruments are different.  McCallum
and Nelson (1999), Orphanides (1999) and McCallum (2000)
suggest a nominal GDP rule such as  ) ( x x P r i t x t          ,
where the rule sets the short-term interest rate equal to the
equilibrium real interest rate plus average inflation plus some
fraction  x    of the deviation of nominal GDP growth over four
quarters from its target.  This rule is not derived from equation (5)
directly.  Rudebusch (2001a) argues that the performance of such a
rule is poor.  Again, Orphanides, Porter, Reifschneider, Tetlow and
Finan (2000) and McCallum (2001) reach a different  conclusion.
Interest rate rules of this type appears to dominate the Taylor rule
when it is difficult to assess the state of the economy in real time.  In
contrast, the Taylor rule dominates if one assumes artificially low
degrees of uncertainty.
To compare the Taylor rule with the McCallum rule directly I
modify the McCallum rule in equation (5).  In this paper, the rule in
equation (5) is modified such that the FFR is the Fed’s policy
instrument instead of the money base.  The modification is based on
the empirical evidence that the relationship between base velocity
and the FFR is stable, which would enable us to substitute changes
in the money base by changes in the FFR and nominal GDP in
equation (5).
Let velocity be a function of the FFR,  t t t i f V      ) ( , where  f  is
an unknown function, either a linear or non-linear function, and  t 
is a mean-zero white noise error term.  It is crucial that the
relationship between velocity and the FFR is stable before we make
any substitution.  An approximation of  f  is also required.
                                       
8 For example, see Goodhart (1994) and Blinder (1994) for arguments against this
rule.
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First, I check the stability requirement.  I provide two different tests
for stability.  The first is based on cointegration.  If the two variables
are cointegrated over a reasonably long period of time then the
relationship between them is said to be stable.
To motivate the idea of cointegration, let us examine a plot of the
levels of base velocity and the FFR from March 1957 to March
2000.  Figure 3 may lend support to the “stability” argument.
To test formally, table 1 reports three regressions: A regression of
the level of base velocity on a constant and the FFR, the Engle-
Granger (ADF) test statistic for the null hypothesis that the residuals
from the level regression above have a unit root, and an error
correction regression.  Results of the regressions indicate that there
is a statistically significant cointegration relationship at the 10 per
cent level, but what really matters the most is that the error
correction term is statistically significant provided that the residuals
are white noise with a zero mean.  The error correction term is
indeed significant and the error term is white noise.  Keep in mind
the size of the coefficient  = 0.09.  The stability of the relationship
between base velocity and the FFR can also be investigated in
another way.
In table 2, I take a second, completely different, approach.  The
second approach is to assume that we do not know anything about
cointegration and we do not really trust the ADF - Engle-Granger
test.  How would we test for stability?  I report the estimates from
the regression  t t t e i b a V      , which is a proxy for
t t t i f V      ) ( , over three different sub-samples and test whether


















































the parameters, particularly b, remained constant over time.  The
first sub-sample is from March 1957 to December 1974 – the fixed
exchange rate period – the second sub-sample is from March 1975 to
December 1986 – the flexible exchange rate period.  The last sub-
sample is March 1987 to March 2000 – the Greenspan period.  The
coefficient b is stable as indicated by the F  statistic and has a value
of 0.1, which is not statistically different from the value of   in the
error correction model reported in table 1.
Meltzer (1998) estimates a similar regression using the long-term
interest rate and reports the same coefficient for a century long data
set.  Lucas (1988) and Stock and Watson (1993) report the same
coefficient for a very long data set using demand for money
functions for the United States.
Having established stability between base velocity and the FFR, the
McCallum rule can be modified to include the FFR.  Given that the
relationship between velocity and interest rate is stable then there is
a stable demand for the real money base:
t t t x v b       (6)
Given the approximation:
t t i v     (7)
Equation (6) becomes:
t t t x i b        (8)
Substitute equation (8) in the original McCallum rule in equation
(5).
) ( t x
a
t t t x x V x i x               (9)
Re-arranging terms yields:











The hat on  t i  is to distinguish the interest rate implied by this rule
from that implied by the Taylor rule.  The modified McCallum rule
in equation (10) differs from the original rule in equation (5) in three
ways: First, the monetary policy instrument is the FFR and not the
money base, which dropped out.  Second, the response coefficient
x    (0.5) is larger, equals 1+ x    (1.5).  Third, the modified rule is
scaled by the parameter , which measures the sensitivity of base
velocity to changes in the FFR.  Further, equation (10) suggests that,
in addition to the usual argument of the rule, the level of the FFR
implied by the rule at time t also depends on the level of the FFR
implied by the rule last period, ie, monetary policy inertia.  Thus, the
policymaker takes into account her past policy action when making
decisions today.  And finally, this rule is much closer to a nominal
GDP rule than to a money base rule.
There is a major difference in the way the Taylor rule in equation (2)
and the modified McCallum rule in equation (10) work.  The Taylor
rule suggests that the Fed raises the interest rate vigorously, but
gradually in response to current deviations of output and inflation.
This partial adjustment is determined by the size of  .  In the
modified McCallum rule, equation (10), when nominal GDP growth
exceeds its target rate, the Fed keeps raising the FFR until nominal
GDP growth is equal to its target.  This continuous response is an
important feature of this rule that differentiates it from the Taylor
rule. There is no smoothing or gradual adjustment in the modified
McCallum rule.  In this regard, equation (10) is similar to the rule in
Levin et al (2001).
However,  in equation (10), which measures the sensitivity of base
velocity to changes in the FFR acts as a smoother.  A large value of
 dampens the volatility of nominal GDP growth fluctuations and
makes past FFR important in a similar way the smoothing parameter
in the Taylor rule works.  The way the rule works is not by
vigorously responding to the deviations of nominal GDP growth
from its target (ie,  ) / ) 1 (   x   is small in magnitude) but by10
continuously hammering on these deviations.  This is in essence
similar to Bernanke and Woodford (1997).
9
I plot the Taylor rule, equation (2), and the modified McCallum rule,
equation (10).  The Taylor rule in equation (2) is calibrated using
2  r , 2  
a
t P , 5 . 0 P    ,  5 . 0 y ~   and  24 . 0   .  For the
McCallum rule, average velocity is calculated for as a four-year
average, ) )( 16 / 1 ( 17 17 1 1        t t t t b x b x , 5 . 0  x   and  5 . 4  x .  We
don’t know .  I estimate   from the data to be 50,
10 which provides
substantial smoothing.  Equation (2) and (10) are plotted in figure 4.
The two rules look similar, flat, in the 1960s and 1970s, but there is
a little disagreement between them at the second half of the sample
starting in the 1980s.  Changes in the FFR implied by either the
Taylor or the modified McCallum rules do not match the change in
the FFR.  The changes in the FFR implied by both rules are much
smoother than the actual changes in FFR.
11
Of course if the magnitude of   gets smaller the changes in the FFR
implied by the modified McCallum rule become more volatile and
matches with the actual changes in FFR.  However, this kind of
volatility will not be so apparent if we plot the rule in the levels
instead because of the high persistence of interest rate in the rule and
the fact that  ) / ) 1 ((   x    is small in magnitude.  The first term in
equation (11) dominates the second.
Although the modified McCallum rule response to the nominal GDP
growth deviations from target is small in size,    / 1 x   =
1.5/50=0.03, it is stable and there is no indeterminacy problem.  The
eigenvalues are fine and the response to past interest rate and
nominal GDP growth indicates that the root is less than one.
                                       
9 They argued that a rule like  t t t i i     1  with a small and large has a similar
stabilisation properties as a rule like  t t i   with a large except that it is much
smoother.
10 Equation (10) is estimated by non-linear least squares from March 1962 to March
2000. The  t -statistic is 2.5, 
2 R is 0.12 and DW is 1.63. Estimating the same
regression from 1980 to 2000 gives similar results.
11 The correlation coefficients between the change in FFR and each of the rules are
–0.34 and 0.35 for the modified McCallum rule and the Taylor rule respectively.
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Equation (10) in levels is given by:













The level equations are plotted in figure 5. The FFR implied by the
two rules and the actual FFR are indistinguishable.  In general,
figures 4 and 5 reveal that the linear relationship  t t i V      is a
good proxy for t t t i f V      ) (.
Further, the two rules in the level and the actual FFR are
cointegrated.
12  The cointegration relationship is plotted in figure 6.
                                       
12 A Johansen system consists of the Federal funds rate, the interest rate implied by
the Taylor rule 
*
t i  and the interest rate implied by the modified McCallum rule  t i ˆ ,
a constant in the unrestricted model, each variable includes a linear trend that is
not present in the cointegration relationship. The system has six lags.  The trace
and lambda max test statistics indicate that there is perhaps one cointegrating
relationship.  Results are not reported, but they are available upon request.





























Taylor Rule (eq. 2)
Modified McCallum Rule (eq. 10)
Change in FFR



























FFR Taylor Rule (eq.3)  Modified McCallum (eq.11| k=50)12
So far, the results suggest that these two different policy rules can be
made similar if sufficient smoothing is applied to the rules such that
past interest rate, interest rate smoothing or policy inertia dominate
the rules’ arguments.  Or, if the amount of smoothing chosen is such
that the two rules are the same.  This seems trivial.  Also, it seems
discomforting.  These results suggest that the policymaker may be
free to adopt any policy rule, even most volatile ones, provided that
sufficient interest rate smoothing is applied.
Economists evaluate the stabilisation properties of policy rules by
comparing the unconditional variances of inflation and output.
These unconditional variances can be computed in different ways.
Model-based simulation is a typical way.  The results presented so
far will be tested further using model-based simulations, which will
be presented next.  The results presented above are confirmed.
4 Model-based evaluations of the two rules
McCallum advocates robustness in the sense that a policy rule
should perform well across different models.  This is because
economists do not agree on a particular macroeconomic model.
Typically, researchers either estimate different models (eg,
Rudebusch (2001), and McCallum and Nelson (1999b)) or calibrate
different models.  Then, these models are simulated along with the
policy rules.  The simulations are stochastic in the sense that a large
number of shock realizations are generated randomly from a
distribution that has the covariance properties of the historical shock
estimates.  Although one can compute the unconditional variances































without conducting stochastic simulation, Bryant et al. (1993, p.
373-375) suggest that stochastic simulation are consistent with the
robustness issue.
In this paper, I choose a well-known New Keynesian model that has
recently been estimated by Rudebusch (2001) and Dennis (2001).
Meyer (2001) calls the New Keynesian model “The consensus
model.”  The model is also endorsed by Svensson (1999b), Clarida
et al. (2000), McCallum and Nelson (1999a, b), Rotemberg and
Woodford (1999) and Taylor (1999) and it is shown to have a
foundation in dynamic general equilibrium models.  The model
consists of two equations, a Phillips curve and an aggregate demand
curve.  The Phillips curve is given by:
t t i t
i
i t t t y a P a P E a a P 1 1 12
4
1
11 1 11 10
~ ] [             

  (12)
The inflation rate t P  is 400 * ) ln (ln 1   t t P P where t P is a price index.
The inflation rate depends on expected inflation, which consists of
two components: a forward looking expectation and a fully
backward-looking component that consists of four lagged values of
inflation.  Inflation also depends on lagged value of the output gap.
The output gap is  100 * ) ln (ln
P
t t y y  , where t y is real GDP and
P
t y is
the estimate of potential output published by the Congressional
Budget Office.  The restriction  1 11 11    a a  is typically tested and
imposed on the model.
Researchers used different measures of inflation.  For example,
Rudebusch (2001a) and Dennis (2001) use GDP chain-weighted
price index.  Researchers also used different ways to estimate the
degree of forwardness of inflation expectations.  Rudebusch (2001a)
used the University of Michigan Survey data of a year ahead
expected price changes, while Dennis (2001) assumes  11 a =0 in the








Others used ML estimator (Fuhrer, 1997).
13
                                       
13 Also, see Roberts (1995, 2001).14
The second equation in the model is the output equation, which is
the intertemporal Euler equation given by:
t t t t t t t r P E i a y E a y 2 1 22 1 21 ) ( ~ ~          (13)
Rudebusch (2001a) shows that when this model is simulated along
with a McCallum rule like  ) ( x x P r i t x t t           or
1 ) (        t t x t i x x i    and allowing for model and output gap
uncertainty it indicates that the rule has very poor stabilisation
properties.  In other words, the unconditional variances of inflation,
output and changes in interest rates are large.  Because the objective
of this paper is to evaluate the stabilisation properties of the
McCallum rule derived in equation (10), I will use the same model.
Data uncertainty is beyond the scope of this paper.
The experimental design
The inflation rate is defined in terms of the CPI instead of the GDP
chain-weighted price index.  It will be shown that the choice of the
price index has a crucial impact on the degree of forwardness of
expected inflation in the Phillips curve.  The output gap is similar to
the output gap used in Rudebusch (2001a) and Dennis (2001),
deviations of real GDP from potential output measured by the CBO.
The forward-looking component is measured by the University of
Michigan Survey data of changes in prices,  3 1    t t P E .  The monthly
survey data are averaged to get the quarterly figures.  The empirical
inflation and the output equations given by Rudebusch (2001a) are:
t t i t
i
i t t t y a P a P E a a P 1 1 12
4
1
11 3 1 11 10
~ ) (             

   (14)
t t t t t t t P E i a y a y a a y 2 3 1 1 23 2 22 1 21 20 ) ( ~ ~ ~              (15)
where  20 a  is  r a22  in equation (13).  I calibrate the model from March
1980 to March 2000. This sample period represents most of the
Volcker-Greenspan period.  I start the calibration from 1980 instead
of March 1979 or earlier because some researchers suggested that
there is a structural break in 1979 (Fuhrer (1997), Rotemberg and
Woodford (1997), Clarida et al (1998)).
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I calibrate the Phillips curve and the output gap equations (14) and
(15) using values for the coefficients within the ballpark of
coefficient values reported in Rudebusch (2001a) and Dennis (2001).
The output gap equation is given by:
t y ~  = - 0.24 + 1.28 1
~
 t y  -0.37 2
~
 t y -0.08( 3 1     t t t P E i )( 1 6 )
Three different versions of the Phillips curve are used.  Two of them








i  . So the Phillips curve has only backward-looking
expectations.  In the second, I set  11 11 a a   = 1 and for  ’s I use
coefficients similar to those reported in Rudebusch (2001a).   The
third version of the Phillips curve is an estimated one.  The output
gap equation is the same in all three cases.
The three Phillips equations are:
Backward-looking expectations
t P  = 0.06 + 0.65 1   t P  - 0.10 2   t P +
0.30 3   t P + 0.15 4   t P +0.15 1
~








i  , Dennis (2001).
Mixed expectations
t P  = 0.06 + 0.30 3 1    t t P E +0.70*[0.65 1   t P -0.10 2   t P
+0.30 3   t P +0.15 4   t P ] + 0.15 1
~
 t y (18)
Note that  1 11 11   a a , Rudebusch (2001a).
Forward-looking expectations
There is no consensus among researchers about the degree of
forwardness (of inflation expectations) in the Phillips curve.  Ball16
(1999), Svensson (1999a) and Orphanides (1999) set  11 a  to zero.
McCallum and Nelson (1999a, b) and Rotemberg and Woodford
(1999) set  11 a =1.  Estrella and Fuhrer (2001) argue that  11 a =0 and
Rudebusch (2001a) estimates  11 a  to be 0.29.  While the estimation
techniques, sample sizes, and measurements vary from one paper to
another the consensus conclusion is: expectations are more
backward looking than forward looking in the Phillips curve.
Figure 7 is a scatter plot of the CPI inflation rate and the University
of Michigan Survey of price changes from 1980:1-2000:1.
I estimate two regressions.  The first regression is a single-equation








           t
i
t i t t t y a P P E a a P  (19)
The second regression is to estimate the Phillips curve and the
output gap equation (14 & 15) simultaneously from March 1980 to
March 2000 by FIML.
t t
i
t i t t t y a P P E a a P 1 1 12
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1 3 1 11 10
~           

    (20)
t t t t t t t P E i a y a y a a y 2 3 1 1 23 2 22 1 21 20 ) ( ~ ~ ~              (21)
The coefficient  20 a  in equation (21) is  r a22  in equation (13).  The
results are reported in table 3 (a, b).  The hypotheses that coefficient





































i a  =1 does not hold either.  The estimates of  20 a  (-0.24) and
23 a  (-0.08) imply that the equilibrium real interest rate is 0.019,
which is approximately 2 per cent as Taylor suggested.
Thus, the third model I simulate is the following forward-looking
model:
t P  = -0.66 +1.1  3 1    t t P E + 0.15  1   t P -0.17  2   t P +
0.20 3   t P -0.05 4   t P  +0.12 1
~
 t y (22)
t y ~ =  - 0.24 + 1.28 1
~
 t y  -0.37 2
~
 t y -0.08( 3 1     t t t P E i )( 2 3 )
With each of the models, the backward-looking, mixed expectations
and the forward-looking, I simulate the two policy rules, the Taylor
rule in equation (2) and the modified McCallum rule in equation
(10) separately (there is some evidence that the rules in differences
are more robust than the rules in levels). The identity
t t t P y x      , and the fact that 
P
t t t y y y   ~  and 
P
t t t y y y     ~
are used in the simulations.  I experimented with different degrees of
smoothing in the Taylor rule.
Each model and the policy rule are solved simultaneously.  First, I
solve the model deterministically using static simulation for each
observation from March 1980 to March 2000 and an iterative
algorithm (Gauss-Seidel) to compute the values of the endogenous
variables  P  ,  t y ~  and  t i  .   Then the model is solved stochastically.
In this simulation, the model is solved repeatedly for different draws
of the stochastic components of the model (the innovations to the
Phillips curve and the output gap equations).  The coefficients are
fixed over the simulation. The innovations of the stochastic
equations are generated by independently randomly drawing from
the standard normal distribution.  Each simulation consists of 1000
iterations.
The results suggest that the hypothesis, that the unconditional
volatility of inflation and the output gap across all three models and18
the two rules are equal, cannot be rejected.  However, the
unconditional volatility of  t i   across models and rules is sensitive to
the degree of interest rate smoothing in the rules.  The degree of
interest rate smoothing in the modified McCallum rule (equation 10)
is determined by   / 1 , which is fixed to 1.5/50 (0.03).  This provides
much higher smoothing than   = 0.24 provides to the Taylor rule.
One can always choose the degree of interest rate smoothing in the
Taylor rule,  , such that the two rules have similar effects on the
variance of  t i  .  As the value of   in the Taylor rule increases (ie,
less interest rate smoothing) the unconditional variance of  t i 
increases.  I report the results of two experiments, one when   is
0.24 (ie, modified McCallum rule smoothes interest rate more than
the Taylor rule does), and the other when   is 0.02 and 0.01
(arbitrary).  This implies that the modified McCallum rule and
Taylor rule have equal degrees of interest rate smoothing.  When 
in the Taylor rule is 0.24 the modified McCallum rule has superior
stabilisation properties, and when   is 0.02 and 0.01, the two rules
produce the same volatility across all models.
Table 4a reports the unconditional standard deviations of the actual
data, and of the simulated paths of inflation, the output gap and the
change in FFR (when   is 0.24).  It also reports the probability of
theF statistics, which test the hypothesis that these unconditional
standard deviations are equal.  Table 4b is similar to table 4a except
that in the Taylor rule is 0.02 and 0.01 (more interest rate
smoothing than when   is 0.24).
The modified McCallum rule is stable even though the rule is
presented in terms of  t i   as a function of (  , , , t
a
t x V   ).  Although
the response to deviations of nominal GDP growth from its target is
relatively small in magnitude (ie,  03 . 0 / ) 1 (     ) and the response
of  t i to its own past is large (ie, 1), the rule achieves its objective by
continuously responding to the deviations until they are eliminated.
This is in essence similar to what Bernanke and Woodford (1997)
have proposed.  They argued for more interest rate smoothing in an
interest rate rule that has a small response coefficient to inflation’s
deviations and a large response coefficient to past interest rate. They
showed that this rule has similar stabilisation properties as an
interest rate rule that responds only to inflation’s deviation with a
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very large coefficient.  The difference is that the former rule is
smoother than the later.  The modified McCallum rule in this paper
should not be confused with, and it is not the same as a constant
interest rate rule or an interest rate peg rule.  This rule has different
stabilisation properties.
These results are not surprising and confirm the propositions stated
in the introduction.  They suggest that one can choose the smoothing
parameter such that a similar path for  t i  can be computed using
many different policy rules.  Levin et al (2001) demonstrate that a
policy rule that is nearly optimal is a rule with a high interest rate
smoothing
5 Conclusions
It is difficult to compare the Taylor rule with the money base-
nominal GDP targeting rule because the instruments are different.
The policy instrument in the Taylor rule is the Federal funds rate
(FFR).  In the money base-nominal GDP targeting rule, the
instrument is the monetary base.  The underlying theories of
transmission mechanism of the two rules are also different.
To compare the two rules this paper modifies the money base-
nominal GDP targeting rule by replacing the monetary base as the
instrument with the FFR.   This rule is referred to as the modified
McCallum rule.  To modify the rule, I relied on the empirical
evidence that base velocity is, on average, a stable function of the
FFR.  In other words, base velocity is either cointegrated with the
actual FFR or the coefficients of the regression of interest rate on
velocity are stable over a long period of time.  It was assumed that
changes in velocity are proportional to changes in the FFR.  This
linear approximation proved to be a good proxy for the underlying
relationship between base velocity and the FFR.  This smoothed
modified McCallum rule is in fact very similar to the Taylor rule in
the level.  The levels of the modified McCallum rule, the Taylor rule
and the FFR are themselves cointegrated.
There is a disagreement on the stabilisation properties of the
McCallum rule when the instrument is the nominal interest rate.
Some stochastic simulation exercises using a “consensus” New20
Keynesian model suggest that the McCallum rule has inferior
stabilisation properties. Also, it has been argued elsewhere that the
rule would produce more volatility in output and inflation and it
would typically introduce instrument instability or in other words, a
highly volatile path for the interest rate.  Other research
demonstrates that the rule dominates the Taylor rule under certain
conditions.
In this paper I tested the stabilisation properties of the two rules
using the same New Keynesian model that is typically used in
evaluation experiments.  Three models were used.  They differ in the
degree of forwardness of inflation expectations (backward looking,
forward-looking and a mixed expectations).  I found that the Taylor
rule and the modified McCallum rule can be made essentially
equivalent in the sense that the unconditional volatility of inflation
and output are similar across the models.  For the two rules to have
similar stabilisation properties they have to have similar “sufficiently
high” degree of interest rate smoothing.  The modified McCallum
rule presented in this paper is stable. The modified McCallum rule
achieves its objective not by responding so aggressively to
deviations of nominal GDP growth from the target, but rather by
continuously responding the deviations until they are eliminated.
21
References
Ball, L, (1999), “Efficient rules for monetary policy,” International
Finance, Vol. 2, 63-83.
Bernanke B and M Woodford, (1997), “Inflation forecasts and
monetary policy,” Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 653-
684.
Blinder, A S, (1994), “The rules-versus discretion debate in the light
of recent experience,” Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv, CXXIII,
400-414.
Bryant, R C, P Hooper and C L Mann, (1993), Evaluating Policy
Regimes: New Research in Empirical Macroeconomics,
Washington: Brookings Institution.
Clarida, R, J Gali, and M Gertler, (2000), “Monetary policy rules
and macroeconomic stability: Evidence and some theory,”
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 147-180.
Clarida, R, J, Gali and M Gertler, (1998), “Monetary policy rules in
Practice: Some international evidence,” European Economic
Review 42, 1033-67.
Dennis, R, (2001), “The policy preferences of the US Federal
Reserve,” Manuscript, Federal Reserve Bank of San
Francisco.
Estrella, A and J Fuhrer, (2001), “Dynamic inconsistencies:
counterfactual implications of a class of rational expectations
models,” Manuscript, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston.
Forthcoming in the American Economic Review.
Feldstein, M and J Stock, (1994), “The Use of a Monetary
Aggregate to Target Nominal GDP,” in Monetary Policy (ed.
G Mankiw), 7-62.  Chicago: Chicago University Press.22
Fuhrer, J C, (1997), “The (Un) importance of forward-looking
behavior in price specifications,” Journal of Money, Credit
and Banking, vol 29, no 3, 338-350.
Goodhart, C E A, (1994), “What should central banks do? What
should be their macroeconomic objectives and operations?”
The Economic Journal, vol 104, 1424-1436.
Gordon R, (1985),“The Conduct Of Domestic Monetary Policy,” in
Monetary Policy in Our Times (ed. A. Ando et al.) 45-81.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Hall, R and G Mankiw, (1994), “Nominal Income Targeting,” in
Monetary Policy (ed. G Mankiw), 71-93.  Chicago: Chicago
University Press.
Judd, J P and G Rudebusch, (1998), “Taylor’s Rule and the Fed:
1970-1997,”  Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco
Economic Review, no 3, 3-16.
Laubach, T and J C Williams, (2001), “Measuring the neutral rate of
interest,” Federal Reserve Board of Governors. Washington
DC.
Levin, A, V Wieland and J C Williams, (2001), “The performance of
forecast-based monetary policy rules under model
uncertainty,”  Federal Reserve Board of Governors.
Washington DC.
Lucas, R Jr, (1988), “Money demand in the United States: A
quantitative review,” Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series
on Public Policy 29, 137-68.
McCallum, B T, (1988), “Robustness properties of a rule for
monetary policy,” Carnegie – Rochester Conference on Public
Policy 29, 173-204.
23
McCallum, B T and E Nelson, (1999a), “Performance Of
Operational Policy Rules In An Estimated Semi-Classical
Structural Model,” in Monetary Policy Rules (ed. John
Taylor), 15-54.  Chicago: Chicago University Press.
McCallum, B T and E Nelson, (1999b), “Nominal income targeting
in an open-economy optimizing model,” Journal of Monetary
Economics, vol 43, 553-78.
Meltzer, A, (1998), “Monetarism: the issues and the outcome,”
Atlantic Economic Journal, vol 26, no 1, 8-31.
Meltzer A, (1987), “Limits of short-run stabilisation policy,”
Economic Inquiry 25, 1-13.
Meyer, L H, (2001), “Does money matter?” Federal Reserve Bank of
St. Louis, the 2001 Homer Jones Memorial Lecture.
Orphanides, A, (2000), “Activist stabilisation policy and inflation:
The Taylor rule in the 1970s,” Federal Reserve Board of
Governors, Washington, DC.
Orphanides, A, (1999), “The quest for prosperity without inflation,”
Manuscript,  Federal Reserve Board of Governors.
Washington, DC.
Orphanides, A, (1997), “Monetary policy rules based on real-time
data,” Finance and Economics Discussion Paper Series, 1998-
03, Federal Reserve Board of Governors, Washington DC.
Roberts, J, (1995), “New Keynesian economics and the Phillips
Curve,” Journal of Money Credit and Banking, 975-84.
Roberts, J, (2001), “How well does the Keynesian Sticky-Price
Model fit the data?” FEDS Working Paper 2001-13, Federal
Reserve Board, Washington, DC.
Rotemberg, J and M Woodford, (1999), “Interest Rate Rules In An
Estimated Sticky Price Model,” in Monetary Policy rules (ed.
John Taylor), 57-119.  Chicago: Chicago university Press.24
Rudebusch, G, (2001a), “Assessing nominal income rules for
monetary policy with model and data uncertainty,”
Forthcoming in the Economic Journal.
Rudebusch, G, (2001b), “Term structure evidence on interest rate
smoothing and monetary policy inertia,” Manuscript, Federal
Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
Stock, J and M Watson, (1993), “A simple estimator of cointegrating
vectors in higher order cointegrated systems,” Econometrica
61, 783-820.
Svensson, L, (1999a), “Inflation targeting: some extensions,”
Scandinavian Journal of Economics, vol 101, 337-61.
Svensson, L, (1999b), “Inflation targeting as a monetary policy
rule,” Journal of Monetary Economics, vol 43, 607-54.
Taylor, J, ”An historical analysis of monetary policy rules,” in
Monetary Policy Rules (ed. John Taylor), (1999), 319-41.
Chicago University Press, Chicago, IL.
Taylor J B, (1993), Macroeconomic Policy in a World Economy, W
W Norton, New York.
25
Table 1: Relationship between velocity and the 
interest rate 1957:1 – 2000:1
OLS  t t t ffr V       1 0
Coefficient t- Statistics P- Value
0  13.4 51.89
* 0.0001




t V  is the base velocity defined as  t t t b Y P /,  w h e r e   t P is GDP deflator,  t Y
is real GDP and  t b  is the money base.  The FFR is given by  t ffr .
The Engle-Granger Test
OLS  t i t
j
i






0   0.01  0.40 0.6854
 -0.08 -3.00
# 0.0032
1   0.15  1.96 0.0520
2  -0.12 -1.54 0.1238
3   0.06  0.85 0.3960
4   0.15  1.97 0.0494
The asymptotic critical value at the 95% level is -3.34 so the
cointegration is significant at the 90% level.
An Error Correction Regression
OLS  t t t t i V           1
Coefficient t-Statistics P-Value
  0.02  1.81 0.0720






Asterisks mean significant at the 95% level.26
Table 2
OLS  t t t e i b a V     








F  is to test the hypothesis that bis equal across sub-samples.
P values in parentheses.
Table 3a








          t i t
i
i t t t y a P P E a a P 
Coefficient Estimate t-statistic Prob.
10 a -0.62 -1.07 0.2880
11 a  1.15  2.84 0.0058
1   0.12  0.90 0.3670
2  -0.18 -1.45 0.1491
3   0.23 1.92 0.0590
4  -0.07 -0.70 0.4838
12 a  0.12 1.43 0.1564
Wald 1 : 11 0  a H  0.70 0.8875
2 R  0.67
DW  2.08
 ˆ  1.56
The Wald statistic tests the hypothesis that  11 a  =1.
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Table 3b








          t i t
i
i t t t y a P P E a a P 
) ( ~ ~ ~
3 1 1 23 2 22 1 21 20            t t t t t t P E i a y a y a a y
Coefficient Estimate t-statistic Prob.
10 a -0.64 -1.21 0.2258
11 a  1.11  3.14 0.0017
1   0.15  1.12 0.2633
2  -0.17 -1.51 0.1307
3   0.20  1.82 0.0685
4  -0.04 -0.41 0.6786
12 a  0.12  1.85 0.0643
















i Wald  14.58 0.0001
2 R  0.67
DW  2.10
 ˆ  1.56
20 a  -0.24 -1.52 0.1269
21 a  1.28 11.60 0.0001
22 a -0.37 -3.56 0.0004





Unconditional Standard Deviation of the Endogenous Variables













P   2.762894 2.857274 2.854476 0.9930
y ~  2.325268 2.161327 2.133673 0.9086
i   1.141051 0.701355 0.077573 0.0000
New Keynesian
Mixed Expectations Model
P   2.503492 2.500447 0.9913
y ~  2.176283 2.149646 0.9126
i   0.686967 0.022502 0.0000
New Keynesian
Forward-Looking Model
P   2.219793 2.188742 0.9000
y ~  2.216740 2.189973 0.9137
i   0.680162 0.020061 0.0000
a , F statistics test the hypothesis that the variances  P
2
  ,  y ~
2   and
i 
2   corresponding to the model with the Taylor rule are equal to
those corresponding to the model with the modified McCallum rule
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Table 4b
Unconditional Standard Deviation of the Endogenous Variables












P   2.762894 2.853956 2.854476 0.9987
y ~  2.325268 2.137075 2.133673 0.9887
i   1.141051 0.072356 0.077573 0.5349
New Keynesian
Mixed Expectations Model
( 01 . 0   )
P   2.500325 2.500447 0.9997
y ~  2.150952 2.149646 0.9957
i   0.028331 0.022502 0.0409
New Keynesian
Forward-Looking Model
( 01 . 0   )
P   2.217431 2.188742 0.9076
y ~  2.191263 2.189973 0.9958
i   0.028056 0.020061 0.0030
a , F statistics test the hypothesis that the variances  P 
2  ,  y ~
2   and
i 
2   corresponding to the model with the Taylor rule are equal to
those corresponding to the model with the modified McCallum rule.